Cubans in Angola by Marquez, Gabriel Garcia
The following account o f Cuban military activities in Angola has been excerpted, from a 
lengthy article by Gabriel Garcia Marquez and distributed by P rensa  Latina the Cuban 
news agency. Originally published in the US radical newspaper The Guardian early this 
year, it is based on extensive interviews in Cuba with officials and soldiers who went to 
Angola.
The author, a progressive writer born in Colombia in 1928, is considered one o f Latin 
America’s foremost living writers. He is most widely known in the US for his novel One 
Hundred Y ears o f  Solitude.
In 1843, a female slave called Black 
Carlota had taken machete in hand to lead a 
slave uprising at the Triunvirato sugar mill, 
in the Matanzas region, and had been killed 
in the rebellion. In homage to her, the action 
of solidarity to Angola was named Operation 
Carlota.
It began with the sending of a reinforced 
battalion of special forces, made up o f 650 
men. They were flown over a span of 13 days 
from the military section o f Jose Marti 
Airport in Havana to the airport at Luanda, 
still occupied by Portuguese troops.
Their mission was to hold back the (South 
Africa-UNITA-FNLA) offensive so the 
Angolan capital would not fall into enemy 
hands before the Portuguese left, and then to 
keep up the resistance until reinforcements 
could arrive by sea.
But the men on the first two flights were 
sure they were already too late, and the only 
hope they nourished was that they might be 
able to save (the province of) Cabinda.
The first contingent left at 4 pm, November 
7, on a special flight o f Cubana de Aviacion, 
on one of the legendary Bristol Brittania BB- 
218 tu rboprops  that  the En g l i sh  
manufacturers had stopped making and the 
rest o f the world had stopped u sing....
The passengers, who remember clearly 
that they numbered 82 because that was the 
same as the number of men on the Granma, 
the boat that carried Fidel Castro and his 
band to Cuba to launch a revolution, had the 
healthy look o f tourists tanned by the 
Caribbean sun. They all wore summer 
clothes, with no military insignia, and 
carried briefcases and regular passports 
with their real names and identification.
ine members of the special battalion 
which is not under the revolutionary armed 
forces but rather the ministry of the interior, 
are well-trained warriors, with a high level o f 
political and ideological formation. Some 
hold college degrees, are voracious readers 
and occupy themselves with intellectual 
pursuits....
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Cuban soldiers fighting for Angolan liberation
But in their briefcases they carried 
machine pistols, and in the cargo hold of the 
plane, instead of baggage, there was a 
substantial load of light artillery, small 
guns, three 75 mm cannons and three 82 mm 
mortars....
(Just as the first two planes arrived in 
Angola), three ships were leaving Cuba 
bringing an artillery regiment, a mechanised 
battallion and recoiliess rifles; they would 
land in Angola on November 27,
On the other hand, the columns of Holden 
Roberto (head of the FNLA) were so close 
that only hours before they had shot and 
killed an old native woman who was trying 
to reach the headquarters at Gran Farni, 
where the Cuban forces were concentrated.
So the men arriving on the two planes had 
no time to rest: they put on their olive-green 
uniforms, joined the ranks of the MPLA and 
went into battle.
During nine months, the mobilisation of
human and material resources was a drama 
of daring. The decrepit Brittannias, patched 
up with brakes from Soviet-made Ilyushin 
18s, kept up a steady and almost unreal 
traffic....
Cuba’s chief of staff went to Angola 
personally at theend o f November - anything 
was possible then, except losing the war.
But the historical fact is that the war was 
at the point of being lost. In the first week of 
December the situation was so hopeless that 
some thought was given to the possibility of 
fortifying Cabinda and saving a beachhead 
near Luanda for an evacuation.
FIDEL’S INVOLVEMENT
Fidel Castro himself was keeping up to 
date on the smallest details o f the war. He 
was at the sendoff for each troop ship and 
before it sailed he would call together the 
combat units in the theatre at the Cabana. 
He sought out the commanders of the special
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forces battallion that went on the first flight 
and drove them to the steps o f the plane in a 
Soviet-made jeep. It is probable that then and 
in every one o f the other farewells, Castro 
had to hide an envy for those going off to a 
war he could not be in.
By then, there was not a spot on the map of 
Angola that he could not identify, not a quirk 
of the land that he did not know by heart. So 
intensely and meticulously did he follow the 
war that he could cite any statistic of Angola 
as if he were talking about Cuba. He spoke of 
Angola’s cities, its customs and its people as 
if he had lived there all his life.
At the start of the war, when the situation 
was especially pressing, he stayed in the 
general staff command room as long as 14 
hours at a stretch without eating or sleeping, 
as if he were on the campaign.
He followed the progress o f battles, using 
colored indicators on wall-sized tactical 
maps, and was in constant contact with the 
battlefield high command (of the M PLA)....
The difficulties of December were due in 
the first place to the tremendous firepower of 
the enemy which, by this time, had received 
more than $50 million in military aid from 
the US. In the second place, they were due to 
Angola’s delay in asking for help and the 
time it took to get the help to Angola.
Finally, they were due to the miserable 
conditions and cultural backwardness left by 
half a millenium of soulless colonialism. 
That, even more than the first two factors, 
posed the greatest obstacle to a decisive 
integration between the Cuban troops and 
the armed people o f A n gola ....
The Portuguese colonialists....had built
beautiful, modern cities to live in, with air- 
conditioned glass buildings and stores with 
huge electric signs. But these were cities for 
whites, like those the gringos built around
Old Havana ....  Beneath the mask of
civilisation lay a vast and rich land of 
misery: The natives’ standard o f living was
one of the lowest in the world ....  Old
superstitions not only complicated daily life, 
but also hindered the war effort. The 
Angolans had been convinced that bullets 
would not penetrate white skin, they feared 
the magic of airplanes and they refused to go 
into the tremches because tombs were only 
for the dead....
Angola was a dirty war in which one had to 
watch out as much for snakes as for 
mercenaries, as much for cannibals as 
cannonballs. A  Cuban commander, in the 
midst o f a battle, fell into an elephant trap.
At first, the black Africans, conditioned by 
generations of resentment against the 
Portuguese were hostile to the white 
Cubans. Many times, especially in Cabinda, 
Cuban scouts felt betrayed by the primitive 
telegraph of the talking drums, whose 
thump-thump could be heard for as much as 
20 miles.
South Africa’s white troops which fired on 
ambulances with 140 mm. cannons, threw up 
smokescreens on the battlefield to collect 
their white dead, but left the black bodies for 
the vultures ....
In Cuba, all the news coming from Angola 
was bad.
On December 11, in Hengo .... a Cuban 
armored car with four officers in it set out 
along a path where some mines had been 
found.
Although four other cars had already 
passed through safely, the scouts advised 
against the route which cut only a few 
unnecessary minutes o ff the trip. Ignoring 
the advice, the car was almost instantly 
blown up. Two special forces battalion 
commanders were gravely wounded, and 
Commandant Raul Diaz Arguello 
commander o f international operations in 
Angola, a hero of the struggle against 
Batista and a man widely loved in Cuba 
died instantly.
That was the bitterest news for the 
Cubans, but it was not to be the last. The next 
day came the disaster at Catofe, perhaps the 
worst setback of the entire war ....
A South African column had managed to 
repair a bridge under the cover o f the 
morning mists and had surprised the 
Cubans who were in the midst o f  a 
withdrawal. The analysis o f  this defeat 
showed that it was due to an error on the 
Cubans’ part ....
On December 22, at the closing of the party 
congress, Cuba gave its first official 
indication that it had troops in Angola.
The war^vas still not going well. Fidel 
Castro, in the closing speech, reported that
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the invaders in Cabinda had been defeated in 
72 hours; that on the northern front the 
troops of Roberto who had been only 15 miles 
from Luanda on November 10 had been 
forced to retreat to more than 60 miles away; 
and that South Africa’s armored columns 
which had advanced more than 400 miles 
had been blocked more than 120 miles from 
Luanda. The detailed report was comforting, 
but it was far from a victory ....
Cuban aid reached such a level that at one 
point there were 15 Cuban ships on the high 
seas bound for Luanda. The unstoppable 
offensive of the MPLA on all fronts turned 
the tide, once and for always, in its favor .... 
In January, it was conducting operations 
originally planned for April ....
THE TIDE TURNS
After mid-March the South African troops 
began their retreat.
On April 1, at 9.15 a.m., the advance of the 
MPLA troops under the command of Cuban 
commandant Leopoldo Cintras Frias arrived 
at the dam at Raucana, next to the chicken-
wire fence marking the frontier with 
Namibia. An hour and a quarter later the 
South African governor of Namibia .... 
accompanied by two o f his officers, asked 
permission to cross the border to begin talks 
with the MPLA.
Commandant Cintras Frias received them 
in a wooden shed in the 10-yard wide neutral 
strip between the two countries, and the two 
groups gathered around a large dining table
Agreement took only two hours to reach, 
but the meeting lasted longer, for the South 
African general ordered a succulent dinner, 
prepared on the Namibian side. As they 
dined, he offered several toasts in beer ....
Af terwards ,  the program of  the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola 
was agreed to by Castro and (Agostinho) 
Neto during their meeting on March 14 in 
Conakry, after victory was achieved. They 
decided that the withdrawal would be 
gradual but that as many Cubans as needed 
would remain in Angola as long as needed to 
build a modern and strong army, able to 
guarantee the future internal security and
The convoy carrying Sth. African armed forces out o f Angola rolls across the Cunene 
River at Ruacana Falls, 300 metres from the border, bound for the Ruacana military base 
in S. IV. Africa.
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independence o f the country without outside 
help ....
For security reasons, the Cuban press had 
not publ ished any  ment ion  o f  the 
participation in Angola. But, as usually 
happens in Cuba, even with military subjects 
as delicate as this, the operation was a secret 
carefully kept by 8 million persons. The first 
congress of the Cuban Communist Party 
which was to be held late in December and 
which was a sort of national obsession all 
year, took on a new dimension.
The volunteer units had been formed by 
sending private messages to members of the 
first reserve made up o f all males between 17 
and 25 and those who had been members of 
the revolutionary armed forces. They were 
summoned by telegram to report to the 
appropriate military committees, with no 
word of why they were called. The reason 
was so obvious that everyone who believed 
that he had military skills hastened to his 
military committee without waiting for a 
telegram. It took a great deal o f effort to keep 
this mass concern from turning into a 
national disorder.
Insofar as the emergency permitted, 
selection criteria were quite stringent. Not 
only were military qualifications and 
physical and moral condition taken into 
account, but also work background and 
political education.
Nevertheless, there were innumerable 
cases of volunteers itrying to sneak through 
the filtering process. A  qualified engineer 
tried to pass himself off as a truckdriver, a 
high official pretended to be a mechanic, a 
woman almost got away with passing 
herself off as a recent army recruit.
A youth who joined without his father’s 
permission met his father in Angola, because 
his father had also gone without telling hiB 
family. .
CUBA’S AFRICA POLICY
Cuba’s act of solidarity with Angola was 
far from a casual or impulsive act but rather 
the end result of a continuous policy towards 
Africa by the Cuban revolution.
There was only one new or dramatic 
element in this delicate decision: this time it 
was not only a question o f sending what aid 
it could, but of taking on a large conventional 
war some 6000 miles from its own territory,
with the cost in blood and treasure 
incalculable and the political consequences 
unforeseeable ....
It w as a de c i s ion  o f  i rreversib le  
consequences, too large and complex to be 
resolved in 24 hours. Nonetheless, the 
leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba 
Had only 24 hours to decide, and it decided 
without flinching, in a large, calm meeting 
on November 5. Far from what has so often 
been said, it was an independent and 
sovereign act of Cuba. Only after the 
decision was made, not before, was the Soviet 
Union informed.
Contacts between the Cuban revolution 
and the MPLA had been very intense since 
they first began in August of 1965 when Che 
Guevara fought alongside the guerrillas in 
the Congo. The following year Neto himself 
went to Cuba accompanied by Endo the 
military commander of the MPLA, who was 
later killed ....
In May 1975, as the Portuguese were 
getting ready to pull out o f their African 
colonies, Cuban Commandant Flavio Bravo 
met Neto in Brazzaville, and Neto requested 
help with the shipment of arms and asked 
about the possibility of further, more specific 
aid. As a result, Commandant Raul Diaz 
Arguelles led a civilian Cuban delegation to 
Luanda three months later. Neto was more 
precise .... He asked Cuba to send instructors 
to open and run four military training 
camps.
CUBAN SHIPS ARRIVE
Although the MPLA which began in 1956 
was Angola’s oldest liberation movement 
and the only one with a broad popular base, 
and although it offered a social, political and 
economic program that suited the country’s 
conditions, it was nonetheless the one in the 
weakest military position. It had Soviet 
arms, but lacked people trained to use them
So when the (Cuban troopship) Viet Nam 
Heroico arrived in Puerto Amboim at 6.30 
a.m. on October 4, and the Coral Island 
arrived on the 7th and the La Plata at Punta 
Negra on the 11th, they docked without 
anyone’s permission - but also without 
anyone’s opposition.
The Cuban instructors were met by the 
MPLA and immediately set up the four 
training centres: one in Delatando which the
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Portuguese had called Salazar, 100 miles 
east o f Luanda; the second in Benguela, the 
Atlantic seaport; the third in Saurimu, 
formerly Enrique de Carvalho, in the remote 
deserted eastern province of Lunda, where 
the Portuguese had had a military base that 
they destroyed before abandoning; and the 
fourth in the enclave of Cabinda.
ROBERTO’S TROOPS ADVANCE
Roberto’s troops of the opposing FNLA 
were then so close to the Angolan capital that 
a Cuban artillery instructor giving his 
students their first lessons at Delatando saw 
the armored cars o f the mechanised brigade 
of regular South African troops cross from 
Namibia, and three days later they had 
occupied the towns of Sa da Bandeira and 
Mocamedes without meeting any resistance.
It was a Sunday stroll. The South Africans 
had tape cassettes o f lively music in their 
tanks. In the north, the leader o f a mercenary 
column directed operations from a Honda 
sports car, beside a blonde who looked like a 
movie actress. They advanced as if they were 
on holiday, with no scouts out ahead, and 
they probably knew where the rocket came 
from that blew the car into bits. In the 
woman’s overnight case there was only a 
party dress, a bikini and an invitation to the 
victory party Roberto was already planning 
in Luanda ....
By the end of the week, the South Africans 
had penetrated more than 350 miles into 
Angolan territory and were advancing 
towards Luanda at the rate of more than 40 
miles a day. On November 3, they attacked 
the lightly-manned training camp for 
recruits in Benguela. The Cuban instructors 
there had to break off their classes to lead 
their apprentice soldiers against the 
invaders, teaching them during lulls in 
battle ....
The MPLA leaders, prepared for guerrilla 
war but not for large-scale conventional 
battles, then understood that their combined 
neighbors, equipped with the most rapacious 
and devastating resources of imperialism 
could not be beaten without an urgent appeal 
to international solidarity ....
CHE’S AFRICA HISTORY
Nothing demonstrates more clearly the 
length and depth of the Cuban presence in 
Africa than the fact that Che Guevara
himself threw himself into the battles o f the 
Congo at the peak o f his career.
On April 25, 1965, he gave Fidel Castro a 
farewell letter resigning his rank as a 
commandant and everything else that tied 
him to the government of Cuba. On that 
same day, travelling alone, he took a 
commercial flight, using a false passport and 
a false name but not altering his appearance 
.... carrying with him an attache case filled 
with literary works and inhalers for his 
incessant asthma, and killing his empty 
hours in hotel rooms with interminable solo 
games o f chess.
Three months later, in the Congo, he joined 
200 Cuban troops who had travelled from 
Havana in an arms ship. Che’s mission was 
to train guerrillas for the N ational 
Revolutionary Council of the Congo, then 
battling Moise Tshombe, the puppet of the 
old Belgian colonists and the international 
mining companies ....
For greater security (Che) was not listed as 
the head of the mission, so he was known by 
the nom-de-guerre o f Tatu, Swahili for the 
number tw;o.
Che stayed in the Congo from April to 
December 1965, not only training guerrillas 
but also directing them in battle and fighting 
alongside them.
His personal ties with Fidel about which 
there has been so much speculation, did not 
deteriorate at any time. The two kept up 
regular and cordial contacts through very 
efficient systems of communication.
When Moise Tshombe was defeated, the 
Congolese asked the Cubans to withdraw to 
make the armistice easier. Che left as he had 
come, without fanfare.
He took a commercial flight from Dar es 
Salaam, capital o f Tanzania, burying his 
face in a book of chess problems during the 
entire six hours o f flight. In the next seat his 
Cuban adjutant was kept busy, entertaining 
the political commissar o f the army of 
Zanzibar who was an old admirer of Che and 
spoke tirelessly of him throughout the flight, 
asking for the latest news of him and saying 
over and over again how much he would like 
to see him again.
That fleeting, anonymous passage of Che 
Guevara through Africa planted a seed that 
no one could uproot
